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This paper seeks to determine if extended patent terms can positively effect 
the production of drugs that treat rare diseases. It reviews the structure of the 
modern pharmaceutical company and considers the regulatory history that lead to 
this structure. The paper applies historically signif cant economic research in the 
field of patents and considers patent alternatives to establish the best method for 
incentivizing the development of these drugs. The paper finds that while there are 
numerous pitfalls and issues with the patent method, there are no viable 
alternatives. It also concludes that extending patent terms for drugs that treat rare 
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Major drug companies generally spend anywhere from US$180 million1 to 
US$1.3 billion2 to research, develop, and prepare a new drug to take to market. 
Many of the drugs they develop are incredibly important to modern life. 
Numerous crippling ailments have been either controlled or eliminated all 
together due to innovations in the pharmaceutical industry. Treatments once 
available only through expensive surgery and life alt ring processes are now 
available in pill form. The patent system was develop d to enable and protect 
these types of innovations by granting the patentee th  right to exclude others 
from making, using, or selling the claimed inventio during the life of the patent.3 
Despite this, the patent system, as it relates to pharmaceutical products, is heavily 
                                                        
1 Donald W. Light and Rebecca Warburton, Demythologizing the High Costs of 
Pharmaceutical Research, THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL 
SCIENCE, 2011 at 10, available at 
http://www.pharmamyths.net/files/Biosocieties_2011_Myths_of_High_Drug_Research_
Costs.pdf. 
2 Pharm. Research & Mrfs. of Am., Pharmaceutical Industry Profile, 2010 at inside front 
cover (citing Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost of Biopharmaceutical 
R&D: Is Biotech Different? 28 Managerial & Decision Econ. 469 (2007)). 
3 Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have they 
Outlived their Usefulness? A Political, Legislative, and Legal History of the U.S. Law 




criticized for its granting of fixed term monopoly rights to qualified patent 
holders.  
Patents are intended to promote innovation in the pharmaceutical industry 
by granting limited life monopoly rights for qualified drugs. These monopoly 
rights provide market exclusivity that enables pharm ceutical companies to 
recapture the cost of research and development (“R&D”) and facilitate or enlarge 
their eventual profit. Pharmaceutical companies argue that the magnitude of this 
potential profit is what induces them, as rational firms, to engage in R&D since 
there is no guarantee that initial expenditures will lead to a product viable for 
public consumption. After the R&D process, pharmaceuti al companies have to 
achieve the approval of the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) and find a 
populous to market to. Very few drugs make it through all of these stages of 
development. 
The mechanics of the patent system and the rational behavior of firms 
result in the production of only economically viable pharmaceutical products.4 
Patented products in high demand are generously reward d for invention. 
Rational, profit-seeking firms gravitate towards producing these types of 
products. There is, however, very little to incentivize inventors of products which 
                                                        
4 This, of course, ignores the role of government subsidies and programs that are 




are not in high demand by consumers.3 Accordingly, “both impoverished and 
small disease populations are overlooked because activ  investment in these 
groups would not be commercially sound; economic for es favor targeting the 
afflictions of large and wealthy populations.”4 There may be a social need for 
these items but little to no profit incentive for firms. This creates a void in the 
current structure of the patent system. 
There are several ways in which this void can be addressed, all of which 
require some kind of incentive for the producer: “Incentives are necessary 
because market forces will likely drive commercial pharmaceuticals to focus on 
diseases both dire and profitable, an approach which leaves many other disease 
groups by the wayside.”5 Incentive options include government controlled 
research and drug development, direct government gra ts and subsidies, 
centralized information databanks that can be accessed by all drug developers, or 
appropriate manipulation of the patent system. Thispaper postulates that the 
patent system is more practical to achieve targeted drug research efforts.  
  
                                                        
3 Gifford, Daniel J. , How do the Social Benefits and Costs of the Patent Sys em Stack up 
in Pharmaceuticals? 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 75, at 82 (Fall 2004).  
4 Brian Su, Developing Biobanking Policy with an Oliver Twist: Addressing the Needs of 
Orphan and Neglected Diseases, 66 LA. L. REV. 771, 783 (Spring 2006).  




In order to examine the viability of this approach, this paper is divided into 
four sections. First, the paper offers requisite background information on the 
relevant economic aspects of the current pharmaceutical system. Then, the paper 
critically examines relevant economic theory pertaining to patents. Next, the 
paper transitions into a discussion on the state of rare diseases and what can be 
done to incentivize drug development in that realm. Finally, the paper concludes 
that patents are the best method for incentivizing pharmaceutical companies to 










II.  The Pharmaceutical Industry: Some Important 
Economic Aspects 
The structure and operation of pharmaceutical companies and the industry 
in which they operate are both heavily criticized an  controversial. Much of this 
controversy comes from the process undertaken by firms to develop, market, and 
profit from their products. This section discusses the nature of pharmaceutical 
companies and the market in which they operate; the competitive strategies that 
pharmaceutical companies employ and contend with; the outcome of the 
industry’s efforts, including prices, profits, and the impact on the consumer; 
potential alternatives to the patent system; and fially, the section concludes by 
discussing the evolution of the patent system in the U.S. 
A. The Stages in Putting Pharmaceutical Drugs on the Market 
1. Research and Development 
R&D fundamentally underlies the discovery of virtually all 




new medicine from the laboratory to the pharmacy.”6, 7 In 2005, pharmaceutical 
companies backed a study that purported their R&D cost per approved drug to be 
around $1.3 billion.8, 9 Given the time it takes to research and develop drugs and 
the purported costs associated with that research and development, it is not at all 
surprising that R&D is the focus of much of the discu sion on the pharmaceutical 
industry. 
Chemical compounds called proteins control most human biological 
functions. Proteins provide structural support for the body: they act as enzymes 
                                                        
6 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), New Drug 
Approvals in 2003 1 (Jan. 2004) available at 
http://www.phrma.org/newmedicines/resources/2004-01-22. 23.pdf.  
7 Other studies have pinned this timeframe to less than four years. (Donald W. Light and 
Rebecca Warburton, Demythologizing the High Costs of Pharmaceutical Research, THE 
LONDON SCHOOL OF ECON. AND POLITICAL SCI. (2011) available at 
http://www.pharmamyths.net/files/Biosocieties_2011_Myths_of_High_Drug_Research_
Costs.pdf.) 
8 Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost of Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is 
Biotech Different? 28 MANAGERIAL &  DECISION ECON. 469 (2007), available at 
http://www.pharma.org/sites/phrma.org/files/attachments/Profile_2010_FINAL.pdf.  
9 This figure is the most widely cited industry cost e imate and comes from a study 
performed by Joseph DiMasi, Ronald Hansen, and Henry Grabowski. However, the fact 
that this study was backed by the pharmaceutical industry immediately compromises its 
validity. Furthermore, the study was performed at the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug 
Development in Boston, which is not only an industry repository, but also receives 
substantial funding from pharmaceutical companies.  A detailed reconstruction of this 
study found that both the cost of developing a new drug and the associated risks are 
extremely low up until the large final clinical trials. This reconstruction concluded that 
pharmaceutical companies generally recovered their investments within the first 18 
months of production. (Donald W. Light and Rebecca Warburton, Demythologizing the 
High Costs of Pharmaceutical Research, THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECON. AND 






that accelerate essential chemical reactions in cells; they act as antibodies that 
protect cells from attack by foreign substances; they even act as metabolic 
regulating hormones.10 Disease causing protein behavior is often attributed to 
genetic mutations.11 Accordingly, genetics is the focus of much of the R&D 
activities of pharmaceutical companies. Genetic research is also one of the most 
resource intensive and complex R&D endeavors in human history. 
R&D originates in the discovery phase. During this phase, companies 
investigate chemical compounds and determine their ability to bind to and modify 
targeted molecules. Targeted molecules are those molecules expected to affect a 
specific disease. It is estimated that the body contains thousands of these potential 
targets.12 When a promising target is identified, researchers t st the target from 
libraries of molecules developed over the years, lagely by a process of trial and 
error to, determine their likelihood of success against the disease being addressed. 
Promising drug candidates are then put through the preclinical research 
stage. This is where the drugs are tested both in the laboratory and on animals, 
with a focus on the pharmacological aspects of drug evelopment. The 
pharmacological aspects of concern include the relationship between dosage and 
                                                        
10 Rowberg, Richard E., Pharmaceutical Research and Development: A Description and 
Analysis of the Process (CRS Report for Congress, April 2, 2001), 2. 
11 Id. 





toxicity, bioavailability,13 and efficacy. The rate of attrition for compounds at and 
before this stage is high: Of the 5,000 to 10,000 drug candidates screened during 
the discovery stage, only about 250 will make it to the preclinical testing stage.14 
During the preclinical research stage, drug companies file an investigational new 
drug (“IND”) application with the FDA, apply for a patent, and start developing 
economic and quality manufacturing processes for prmising compounds. 
Compounds that successfully complete this stage move onto the clinical trial 
stage.  
Drugs must successfully complete three clinical trils – called phase I, 
phase II, and phase III – before being considered for market approval. Of the 
approximately 250 drug candidates that go through the preclinical research stage 
for a drug development project, usually only 5 make it to the clinical trial stage.15 
During phase I testing, the drug is evaluated for safety on healthy individuals. 
Phase I testing helps determine the maximum safe dos on a particular compound. 
This is done by increasing the dosage on healthy individuals until side effects are 
                                                        
13 Bioavailability measures the drug’s ability to move through and remain in the body. It 
looks at the drug’s ability to reach the drug target with sufficient dose for the therapeutic 
result anticipated. (Aldridge, Magic Molecules, 11-12). 
14 Pharmaceutical Industry Profile 2000: Pharmaceutical Research for the Millennium 
32 (Washington: Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, 2000). 
15 Rowberg, Richard E., Pharmaceutical Research and Development: A Description and 




observed. This phase typically involves anywhere from 10 to 100 participants, 
lasts about a year and a half, and costs about $10 million.16 
During phase II, trials are held to establish the parameters for phase III 
testing of the drug. The parameters to be determined include class (i.e. age and 
gender) and health of the trial patients, what to quantify, and effective dose and 
duration of the treatment.17 Phase II represents the first instance of control gr ups 
taking placebos. An effect from the drug, whether dsired or as a negative side 
effect, must occur in a statistically significant number of participants to be 
definitive.18 The typical duration of phase II trials is about two years, involves 50 
to 500 participants, and costs about $20 million.19 
Finally, in phase III, quantitative measurements of the effectiveness of the 
drug are taken along with an evaluation of side effcts. This phase of clinical 
trials is designed to match as closely as possible how the drug would be used in 
“real life.” This may involve several studies at different locations, each following 
the same protocol. Patients taking part in these studies are selected based on 
characteristics defined during the phase II trials. To determine if the drug is 
pivotal in affecting the disease, a statistically significant portion of the test group 
                                                        
16 Zivan, Justin A. , Understanding Clinical Trials, 282 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 71, at 71 
(April 2000). 
17 Rowberg, supra note 15, at 10. 
18 Zivan, supra note 16, at 73. 




must see a measurable improvement over the control group taking the placebo. 
The FDA usually requires at least two trials concluding that the drug is pivotal to 
grant its approval.  
The clinical trial process is extremely costly. The costs included during 
this period cover: 
• The physicians organizing and running the trials; 
• Data verification and analysis; 
• Support personnel such as nurses and administrative staff; and 
• Payment to physicians and nurses who care for the pati nts 
involved. 
In addition to the costs referenced above, the resea ch and development stage of 
drug formulation also includes the cost of capital. Cost of capital here means the 
opportunity cost of deciding to invest in this particular endeavor as opposed to 
other opportunities.  
2. Regulatory Approval 
After phase III trials are complete, if the results of the drug testing are 




market the drug is submitted to the FDA.20 The FDA will approve only those 
drugs whose results provide a clear indication of effectiveness with manageable 
side effects. The FDA may even require additional phase III trials if it considers 
the results of the trials already run inconclusive.  
Recent studies have found that it now takes much longer to develop, seek 
FDA approval of, and produce new useful drugs: “In 2002 the US FDA approved 
only 17 new molecular entities for sale in the US, which is down from a high of 
56 approved in 1996 and is the lowest since 1983.”21 Furthermore, the amount of 
time it takes to receive FDA approval for a particular compound is quite 
significant: In 2003, the average FDA approval time for a new small molecule 
drug was 16.9 months. The average approval time for a new biologic was 34.7 
months.22  
Once FDA approval is granted, the drug can be marketed to the general 
populace. However, even after approval, the drug is continually assessed. These 
assessments are based on the observations of physicians who prescribe the drugs. 
Drug companies must file adverse drug reaction (“ADR”) reports with the FDA 
                                                        
20 The requirements of a NDA are discussed in more detail in later sections of this paper. 
21 Cockburn, Iain M , The Changing Structure of the Pharmaceutical Industry, HEALTH 
AFFAIRS 10-22 (2004). 
22 Rogoyski, Robert, The Orphan Drug Act and the Myth of the Exclusivity Incentive, 7 




regularly. In some instances, serious issues reveal th mselves in drug use after the 
FDA has approved the drug. These drugs are then remov d from the market.  
The FDA may also offer a conditional approval on a particular drug. In 
this case, the pharmaceutical company may be required to carry out studies 
regarding safety when the drug is already on the market. These later trials are 
labeled phase IV trials.  
3. The Evolution of the Pharmaceutical Industry and its Patents in the 
U.S. 
The U.S. Constitution states that “The Congress shall have Power . . . To 
promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by ecuring for limited times 
to authors and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries.”23 The country’s founders thus saw the need to promote innovation in 
their new land. They also apparently believed that exclusive property rights were 
the best way to achieve this. Later legislators restricted the breadth of these 
property rights: 35 U.S.C. §101 requires that an invention be useful, new, and 
non-obvious to be patentable. These foundational patent references are, however, 
just the beginning of the story on patent legislation in the United States. 
The first notable pharmaceutical patent legislation was the Pure Food and 
Drug Act of 1906. It significantly preceded the first important groups of anti-
                                                        




infective drugs, which were introduced in the mid-1930s.24 In 1938, in response to 
the drug disaster that resulted in the death of over n  hundred children, Congress 
passed the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act requiring new drugs be approved as 
safe before being introduced into interstate commerce.25 The Act was later 
amended in 1962 by the Kefauver-Harris Amendment requi ing that drug efficacy 
and safety be demonstrated on the basis of well-controlled scientific tests prior to 
being approved for marketing by the FDA.26  
The Kefauver-Harris Amendment caused some incongruece between 
patent law and safety requirements. In response to the Amendment, the United 
States Patent Office started requiring proof that a compound was safe and 
effective prior to granting a therapeutic patent.27 This position was quickly 
rejected by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, noting that the purpose of 
granting patents was to spur capital investment requisite for developing and 
marketing inventions regardless of a compound’s compliance with health and 
safety laws.28 It then became common practice to file patent applications for 
                                                        
24 Viscusi, Vernon and Harrington, ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 816 
(3d ed., MIT Press 2000). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Engelberg, Alfred B., Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have they 
Outlived their Usefulness? A Political, Legislative, and Legal History of the U.S. Law 
and Observations for the Future, 39 J.L. &  TECH. 389, at 393 (1999). 




potentially useful therapeutic compounds prior to safety and efficacy tests in 
humans. 
Subsequent to the Kefauver-Harris Amendment, there was a time of 
substantial legislative stalemate in regards to pharmaceuticals and the relevant 
patent process. This period lasted essentially up until the 1980s when public 
sentiment and therefore legislative policy refocused on pharmaceutical and patent 
concerns. The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 was directed towards promoting drug 
development amongst universities and other federally funded programs. It 
allowed these institutions to patent and exclusively license their discoveries, thus 
providing a profit mechanism for their development activities. It has also resulted 
in the ownership of the intellectual property of new drugs by these institutions.29  
Reacting to the limited number of drugs available to treat rare disease, 
Congress passed the Orphan Drug Act (“ODA”) in 1983. It incentivizes drug 
manufacturers who specialize in developing drugs that treat rare diseases 
primarily through a seven-year marketing exclusivity period. During this period, 
other producers can gain FDA approval for a drug with an identical make-up; 
however, they are forbidden from marketing that drug. The ODA also provides 
for a 50 percent tax credit for qualified clinical testing expenses; establishes an 
orphan drug grant program; exempts qualified developers from FDA “user 
                                                        
29 Oullette, Lisa Larrimore, Note: How Many Patents Does it Take to Make a Drug? 
Follow-on Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. 




fees”;30 provides a centralized coordination board for qualified producers to 
reduce wasteful expenditures; provides an assistance program that allows 
qualified developers to request assistance from the FDA in designing clinical 
trials; and allows patients to use drugs during the clinical trial phase.31 All of 
these provisions enable the drug producer to reduce costs and garner a larger 
market share. These producers are also allowed to concurrently seek patents on 
these drugs. 
Before 1984, patent law allowed parties to make and use patented products 
or processes as long as no profit was earned.32 Patent holders would have to prove 
that the infringer was deriving benefit at their exp nse in order to have a 
legitimate patent violation claim.33 Based on this reasoning, generic drug 
companies commonly sought FDA approval to market generic versions of 
patented drugs before the associated patents expired.34 Generic drug companies 
seeking approval to market their products were obligated to file a New Drug 
                                                        
30 While the ODA was enacted in 1983, the FDA user fe was part of legislation that took 
effect in 1992. Accordingly, this user fee provision was not added to the ODA legislation 
until after 1992. 
31 Rogoyski, Robert, The Orphan Drug Act and the Myth of the Exclusivity Incentive, 7 
COLUM. SCI. &  TECH. L. REV. 4 (2006). 
32 Engelberg, supra note 27, at 394. 
33 Engelberg, supra note 27, at 394. 




Application (“NDA”) and to prove that the compound was safe.35 This process 
was done despite the compounds being identical to those previously approved for 
safety by the patent holder. To facilitate this application, the FDA sometimes 
accepted published data as proof of the generic compound’s safety; however, the 
FDA was permitted to request additional expensive clinical trials if there were 
reports of adverse reactions preceding the its approval of the generic product.36 
In 1984, Congress established legislation that greatly facilitated 
competition in the pharmaceutical industry. It enacted the Drug Price Competition 
and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (“Hatch-Waxm n Act”) in response to a 
1983 Supreme Court decision ruling that even when patent protection ceased, 
most generic imitations had to undergo clinical trials nearly as rigorous and costly 
as the originally approved molecule. Title I of theHatch-Waxman Act sought to 
promote the availability of generic drugs while Title II sought to extend the life of 
drug patents and patents of other regulated products by up to five years. This 
helped to compensate for regulatory delay and ensur that innovators had “a 
reasonable opportunity to recoup development costs and to make a profit 
irrespective of the existence of patents.”37 The Hatch-Waxman Act also stipulated 
                                                        
35 Engelberg, supra note 27, at 396–97. 
36 Engelberg, supra note 27, at 397. 




that the period of post-approval patent exclusivity could not exceed 14 years.38 
The Act provided statutory assurances that generic competitors may not enter the 
market until relevant patent rights had been adjudicated.39 Congress also created 
an exemption that allowed generic companies to use, make, or sell a patented 
product when related to the development and submission of that product for 
approval by the FDA.40 Finally, the Act required that brand name companies 
seeking FDA approval for a new drug must file a new drug application (“NDA”). 
This application must include the patent number(s) and corresponding expiration 
dates. It also must include information on patents related to methods of using the 
drug. After the drug is approved, the FDA discloses thi  list in what is known as 
the Orange Book.41 
Hatch-Waxman overwhelmingly affected how both brand name and 
generic pharmaceutical companies operated. Prior to its enactment, 
pharmaceutical companies had to obtain patents on their drugs before applying for 
the lengthy FDA approval process. This drastically reduced the effective patent 
term. On the other hand, generic manufacturers wereforc d to get NDA approval 
                                                        
38 Scherer, F M., Pricing, Profits, and Technological Progress in thePharmaceutical 
Industry, 7 THE JOURNAL OR ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVES, 100 (1993). 
39 Engelberg, supra note 43, at 403. 
40 Herlihy, Reid F., Note: The Federal Circuit’s Interpretation of the Hatch-Waxman Act: 
Allowing Generics to Induce Infringement, 15 FED. CIR. B.J. 119, 121 (2005/2006). 
41 Oullette, Lisa Larrimore , Note: How Many Patents Does it Take to Make a Drug? 
Follow-on Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. 




prior to being able to market a generic version of a drug. This was required 
despite the drug’s identical molecular composition as a previously approved brand 
name version. It was also considered an act of infringement to use or manufacture 
a patented product even if that product was only being tested in preparation for 
FDA approval.42  
To further facilitate competition, the Hatch-Waxman Act modified the 
FDA approval process to include abbreviated new drug applications (“ANDA”). 
To benefit from this expedited drug application process, an ANDA must show 
that the generic drug is already listed, that it has the same active ingredient as the 
listed drug, that the generic drug will be given in the same manner as the listed 
drug, and that the generic drug is the listed drug’s bioequivalent.43  
Finally, Hatch-Waxman created an “artificial act of infringement” 
provision. This provision is based upon the submission of an ANDA and allows 
large pharmaceutical companies to sue generic manufacturers for infringement 
prior to FDA approval. This is intended to prevent promotion by a generic 
company of an infringed patent.44 
In 1992, Congress enacted the Prescription Drug User Fe s Act. It requires 
drug developers seeking FDA approval to pay a user fee. The FDA agreed to use 
                                                        
42 Herlihy, supra note 40, at 121. 
43 Herlihy, supra note 40, at 122. 




the additional revenue associated with this act to hire more reviewers in order to 
speed up the approval process.45 The FDA appears to have followed through on 
its promise: Since the passage of the act, the time i  takes for the FDA to approve 
a drug has dropped from a 30 month average to an 18 month average.46 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, legislation related to patents has created a 
substantial amount of litigation. Some of the most controversial litigation has 
revolved around the concept of unapproved use.  
“The Warner-Lambert decision has rendered unapproved us  
patents practically unenforceable by (1) allowing generics to enter 
the market without any challenge upon the filing of an ANDA and 
(2) announcing standards for a traditional infringement action that 
make it nearly impossible to prevent infringement even after the 
ANDA is approved.”47  
This issue is exacerbated by the fact that doctors are not regulated as to the 
designated use of prescription drugs, which enables generic manufacturers to 
market drugs under a use not covered by patent. “The most important negative 
impact of this situation is not on the pocketbooks f large pharmaceutical 
companies. Rather, it is that a brand-name producer will simply not be willing to 
invest resources for the discovery of new uses.”48 Warner-Lambert was decided in 
                                                        
45 Rogoyski, Robert, The Orphan Drug Act and the Myth of the Exclusivity Incentive, 7 
COLUM. SCI. &  TECH. L. REV. 4, 4 (2006). 
46 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), PhRMA 2003-
2004 Annual Report 4, at 11 (Oct. 2003), available at 
http://www.phrma.org/publications/publications//2003-11-20.870.pdf. 
47 Id. at 134. 




2008 and has reduced both the strength of pharmaceutical patents and the 
incentive for pharmaceutical innovation. 
B. Pharmaceutical Patents: Competition Both During and After the 
Life of the Patent 
1. Competitive Practices During the Life of a Patent 
One manner by which drug companies attempt to limitpressure from 
competitors is through broadly defined patent scopes. A broader patent scope 
allows for greater rights for patent holders. The scope of the patent is determined 
early on in a drug’s development. In initially seeking patent protection of an 
apparently beneficial compound, an inventor must fir specify to the patent office 
how the invention works and then describe the claims underlying that 
specification. For a pharmaceutical invention, an application can make four types 
of claims: (1) a compound claim covering the chemical entity, including any and 
all formulations or uses of the chemical entity; (2) a composition claim covering a 
chemical entity formulated for use as a pharmaceutial; (3) a method-of-use claim 
covering the use of chemical compound or composition n a specified way; and 
(4) a process or method of manufacturing claim covering the way in which a 
compound is produced.  
Based on the four types of claims outlined above, th  patent rules may 




product uses outside of the scope of the patent claim. The Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments, discussed in detail in later sections of this paper, make this practice 
especially pronounced in the pharmaceutical industry since it offers 180 days of 
exclusivity to the first generic manufacturer that files a new drug application.49 
This is because these generic manufacturers could ptentially receive a very 
limited period of market exclusivity simultaneous to the initial patent protection, 
depending on the scope of that patent: The more limited the scope of the patent’s 
protection, the more likely it is that a generic manufacturer will 
contemporaneously be able to profit from the compound.  
Conversely, a broad patent scope enables an inventor to apply their 
pharmaceutical product to many uses. This, of course, widens the potential market 
for the drug. If the drug can be advertised to thisbroader market without fear of 
generic competition, the profit potential of the drug company multiplies. To 
prevent pharmaceutical companies from taking the pre-emptive strategy of 
patenting their innovations for every conceivable us , the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (“US PTO”) limits patent grants to relatively narrowly defined 
uses.  
                                                        
49 Keith Leffler & Cristofer Leffler, Efficiency Trade-Offs in Patent Litigation 
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Pharmaceutical companies may also create drugs known as “me too” 
drugs. Me too drugs are simply minor variations of highly profitable drugs 
already available. They have become the main output of big drug companies.50 In 
fact, from 1998 through 2003 of the 487 drugs approved by the FDA, 379 (78 
percent) were classified as having therapeutic qualities that appear similar to 
drugs already available and only 67 (14 percent) were actually new compounds.51 
This means that firms that hold patents on a particular compound may seek to 
introduce more drugs under that patent and increase their revenue gain instead of 
finding new drugs to affect a different disorder. 
Finally, drug companies that have earned specific patents will often 
engage in “penetration pricing.” These companies will price me too drugs 
relatively low so as to create a market for those drugs. After this market has been 
created, drug companies may increase prices on the drugs in subsequent years 
assuming that there is enough market eminence for the drug to continue to be 
profitable.52  
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2. Post Patent Competition 
Perhaps the most salient argument against patents is that when they expire, 
optimal use of the product they protect is more readily achieved. The effective life 
of a pharmaceutical patent is currently estimated to be between about eight and 
twelve years, with the range narrowing as compounds get more complex. Once 
the patent expires, generic pharmaceutical companies replicate the drug’s 
chemical make-up at a much lower cost since they forego the sunk costs of initial 
research and development. The prices of products previously under patent 
protection therefore decline due to increased competition: “[B]y 1996, forty-three 
percent of the prescription drugs sold in the United States were generic, as 
compared to just nineteen percent in 1984.”53  
More recent figures show that generic pharmaceuticals continue to 
proliferate the drug market. In 2004, generic pharmaceuticals composed 56.4 
percent of the market for drugs: By 2009, generic pharmaceuticals composed 74.5 
percent of the market share.54 The gains in market share of generic 
pharmaceutical companies are due in large part to the numerous drugs introduced 
to the market during the 1990s that went off patent during the 2000s. It resulted in 
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an increase in the number of drugs susceptible to gneric competition from 65 
percent in 2003 to 81 percent in 2009.55 
Logic would suggest that introducing generic competition to 
pharmaceutical markets would result in price declins on drugs. As generic 
competition gains more and more market share, the average pharmaceutical 
treatment cost has decreased significantly. These co ts have decreased across all 
therapeutic treatment classes by a weighted mean of 35.1 percent.56 Accordingly, 
in the case of generic drug proliferation, reality follows logic. 
Brand loyalty does cause some consumers to remain with the previously 
patented drug. This brand loyalty may be on the part of the consumer who used 
the drug before it was available off patent. It may also be on the part of the doctor 
who is familiar with the previously patented drug and/or its sales representatives. 
Marketing by big pharmaceutical companies may also cause doctors and patients 
to continue to purchase certain brand-name drugs. However, outside of these 
limited circumstances, pharmaceutical companies that previously enjoyed patent 
protection can expect to lose a very large portion of their market share at the 
expiration of their patent. 
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C. Market Outcomes 
1. Prices for Drugs with Patent Protection 
The U.S. provides a useful case study to determine the affect of patents on 
the price of prescription drugs. This is because the U.S. employs very little 
regulation of prices in the presence of patents and adheres to the patent standard 
for the protection of inventors’ property rights. Exacerbating this issue is the fact 
that there are more pharmaceutical lobbyists in Washington D.C. than actual 
Congressmen.57 These lobbyists have been able to effectively in co tinue, and 
sometimes extend, patent protections for drugs.  
Brand-name prescription drugs in the U.S. are 35 percent to 55 percent 
higher when compared to other industrialized countries nations.58 With this 
disparity in pricing in mind, Patricia M. Danzon and Michael F. Furukawa 
compared drug prices in nine countries with different r gulatory structures to 
determine whether U.S. consumers were disadvantaged by the current structure. 
They found that the U.S. had the second highest drug p ices for both patented and 
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non-patented drugs and Canada (a country that highly regulates drug prices) had 
the lowest prices.59  
One of the most important conclusions for Danzon and Furukawa’s study 
was the pricing in the U.S. of drugs still on patent. While other countries do allow 
for patent protection of certain pharmaceuticals, they strictly regulate that pricing. 
Because of this, U.S. drug prices are the second highest in the world for drugs still 
on patent.  However, over-the-counter products are considerably cheaper in the 
U.S.  when compared to other countries.60 
Danzon and Furukawa took their study one step further to view the results 
in terms of real dollars. They found that deflating the data by using health 
purchasing power parities, all other countries have higher drug prices than the 
U.S., with the exception of France who is on par with the U.S.61 What this means 
is Danzon and Furukawa viewed the price of drugs in the U.S. relative to the price 
of all healthcare products and services. They found that prices for all health 
services in the U.S. are higher than other countries, not just drugs. High prices for 
drugs in the U.S., therefore, are emblematic of the high price of healthcare in the 
U.S.  
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Price increases for pharmaceutical products in the U.S. have historically 
been greater than contemporaneous increases in other products. From December 
2008 through December 2009, the producer price index for pharmaceutical and 
medicine manufacturing increased by almost 6 percent.62 Over the same time 
period, the producer price index for total manufacturing industries increased by 4 
percent and that for total wholesale trade industrie  decreased by 0.1 percent.63 
The effect of this data is even greater when noting that this was a period of 
economic contraction.  
2. Industry Profits 
In 2002, the median profit margin of the top 10 drug companies in the 
U.S. was 17 percent, which is significantly higher than the 3.1 percent median 
profit margin earned for all other industries on the Fortune 500 list.64 Broken 
down into revenue terms, drug manufacturers on average eceived $0.74 on every 
dollar spent by consumers on prescription drugs going into 2000.65 Extremely 
high profit margins are generally associated with hgh-risk endeavors such as 
start-up companies. However, the risks associated with pharmaceutical companies 
                                                        
62 PPI Detailed Report, Data for December 2009, U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
63 Id. 
64 N. Pattison & L. Warren, 2002 Drug Industry Profits: Hefty Pharmaceutical Company 
Margins Dwarf Other Industries. WASHINGTON D.C.: PUBLIC CITIZEN CONGRESS 
WATCH (June 2003) available at www.citizen.org/documents/Pharma_Report.pdf. 




have drastically decreased thanks to technological innovations. Pharmaceutical 
companies are therefore receiving profits in excess of the risk they are actually 
incurring. 
High revenue figures and profit margins may be explained, at least in part, 
by the fact that profits relate to all drugs owned an  introduced by a specific 
pharmaceutical company, many of which have existed for some time. While some 
“blockbuster” drugs will more than just appropriate th  relevant R&D costs, most 
drugs are wholly unsuccessful in economic terms. The likelihood of a compound 
in preclinical development actually making it to the market is less than 1 in 
4,000.66 Only three out of every ten prescription drugs actu lly taken to the 
market will produce enough revenue to recoup costs spent on R&D.67 
Pharmaceutical companies will often require one blockbuster drug to compensate 
for the numerous commercially unviable drugs. Thus, the amount of time that a 
pharmaceutical company has existed and its number of previous successes are 
highly determinative in its profitability.  
“Pharmaceutical companies are extremely profitable, because they are 
already in a mature state of an R&D company, i.e. th y have projects 
in each stage of the life cycle and a renewing portfolio . . . Because of 
the small probability and the long development time profits on drugs, 
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and consequently their price, must be high. Otherwise innovation 
would not pay off.”68 
The aggregation of the company’s successes and failures facilitate the overall 
profitability of the company despite numerous commercially unviable drugs. The 
proper manner in which to characterize the profitabili y of a pharmaceutical 
company therefore depends on the specific slice of the company in view. 
 As with any industry, it is important to consider the mechanism of 
economies of scale as they relate to the pharmaceutical industry. This mechanism 
is especially important when considering the profitability of drug companies that 
operate in countries with price controls. When drug companies expand their 
markets by entering other countries, they are able to r duce the unit costs of 
production.69 They can then invoke Ramsey pricing, which is a process by which 
companies vary the prices of their goods depending on the elasticity of demand in 
the market they are entering. When firms enter countries with price controls, they 
will continue to sell in those countries despite thelimination of monopoly rents 
because they will still earn normal returns to their capital.70 Under the Ramsay 
pricing model, these firms will still charge the hig er prices in the non-price 
controlled countries, enabling them to continue to reap above normal profits. 
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 Expanding on the concept of price regulation and its effect on 
pharmaceutical profits, John Vernon composed a study to etermine the 
magnitude of this effect. As previously discussed, many countries outside of the 
U.S. have some kind of drug price regulation system. This may be in the form of 
direct price controls, which is the case in France and Italy, limits on social 
insurance reimbursement, which is the case in Germany and Japan, and firm profit 
controls, as in the United Kingdom. Vernon narrowed his analysis to the top 20 
pharmaceutical companies in the world. Of these 20 firms, only 14 firms had 
sufficient data available to perform a regression analysis. Of these 14 firms, only 
nine of them did not undergo a merger during the review period. His period for 
review was from 1994 through 1999. Vernon found that while pharmaceutical 
companies operating in countries with price controls are still profitable, they have 
considerably lower pre-tax pharmaceutical profit margins.71 
 Vernon’s findings seem consistent with expectations  drug company 
profitability across different nations. That being said, variable profit margins may 
depend on factors other than just regulation. There is a “systematic difference in 
the types of pharmaceutical products sold in the USA relative to the rest of the 
world.”72 The U.S. is known for demanding drugs that treat things that simply 
make life more enjoyable (e.g. Viagra or mood enhancers). Medical practices that 
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offer substitutes to drugs may vary from one country to the next. The cost of a 
hospital stay or even the cost to visit a doctor can also affect demand for drugs. 
These factors, among others, will work to limit or exacerbate the effect of price 
controls on pharmaceutical profits. Accordingly, while Vernon found that 
pharmaceutical companies are less profitable in coutries with price controls, 
there are many other factors at play in this finding. 
D. Some Simple Numerical Illustrations of the Aforementioned 
Aspects 
The following sections apply much of the previous discussion to 
pharmaceutical development figures available in the public domain. The first 
section looks at the process that a pharmaceutical company goes through when 
deciding to develop a new drug. The second section applies three frameworks for 
analysis of a second tier of patents that extends their life in the case of orphan 
drugs.   
1. Considerations of the Term Variation 
Under typical circumstances, when deciding whether or not to invest time 
and resources to develop a new drug, pharmaceutical companies perform a 
cost/benefit analysis.  This cost benefit analysis weighs the anticipated costs of 
the endeavor against anticipated benefits of developing the pharmaceutical. 




developing a new drug, netted against economies of scale the company has been 
able to develop. They also take into account any other possible facilitating factors, 
such as experience and previous known breakthroughs. 
In developing their cost/benefit analyses, pharmaceuti al companies first 
estimate the likelihood of successfully developing a new molecular formula that 
could be useful to human beings. This likelihood obvi usly varies on the type of 
drug and the amount of existing research. As noted in prior sections, of 5,000 to 
10,000 initially identified drug candidates, only 250 will, on average, make it to 
preclinical testing. That is, only 2.5 percent to 5.0 percent of identified drug 
candidates make it out of the initial exploratory stage. For simplicity’s sake, this 
analysis assumes that the drug company is experiencd i  the product and benefits 
from economies of scale in development on the particular drug it is attempting to 
develop: Therefore estimated likely success rate is assumed to be 50 percent.  
Next, the pharmaceutical company must consider the likelihood that its 
new drug will achieve FDA approval. As also previously referenced, FDA 
approval occurs for only about 1 percent of new molecular formulas.73 Applying 
this 1 percent approval rate to the 50 percent likely success rate for developing a 
drug that will make it through preclinical testing, the overall probability of 
                                                        





success for this particular firm on this particular drug is thus 0.5 percent (50 
percent * 1 percent).  
After determining the overall likely success rate of the drug, the 
pharmaceutical company must consider the profit it expects to earn on the new 
drug once it reaches the market. Since the probability of success is extremely low, 
a rational firm will require a high potential return on investment to justify the very 
high likelihood of failure. The potential profits of the drug must also take into 
account the sunk costs of research and development as well as the discount rate. 
Ignoring, for the time being, the large research and development cost base, 
assume that the expected profit on the new drug is $1 million per year. This would 
garner $11 million based on the average effective pat nt life of prescription 
medications.74 Assuming that the firm recognizes earnings at the end of each of 
the 11 years of the effective patent period, the $11 million would be discounted in 
year one so that $1,000,000/(1+r), where r is the interest rate. The $11 million will 
be discounted for years one and two in the second year: $1,000,000/(1+r)^2. The 
present value over the course of the patent’s effective term would thus be:  
∑
11
n=1 $1,000,000/(1+r)^n.  
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At an interest rate of 5 percent, the $11 million in future profit would have 
a net present value of $8,306,414.22. If the cost of research and development for 
this drug were a modest $5 million, the net present value of the proposed drug 
would be further reduced to $3,306,414.22 over the 11-year effective patent life. 
Based on the risk analysis associated with this particular drug, this firm would 
have a 0.5 percent chance of earning $300,583.11 per year for 11 years, which 
converts to a total expected return over the life of the patent of $41,532.07. 
If the effective patent life were extended from 11 years to 20 years (i.e. no 
time is lost for research and development or regulatory approval), the firm would 
see higher returns overall and on an annual basis. The net present value of the 
potential profits, taking into account sunken research nd development costs 
would increase to $12,462,210.34. This converts to an annual profit of 
$373,110.52 over the effective life of the patent. Accordingly, in this scenario the 
firm now has a 0.5 percent chance of earning $373,110.52 per year for 20 years, 
which is a total of $12,462,210.34. The firm therefo  has a total expected return 
of $62,311.05 on this particular investment (a 50 percent increase). It is important 
to note that in this example, 20 years constitutes th  maximum potential annual 
profit: After this point, while profits continue to increase, profits per year decline. 
If the risk factor were to change from 0.5 percent chance of success to one 
percent chance, the firms expected return would of course double. What this 




larger the potential profit figure would have to be to justify undertaking that risk. 
It shows that patent terms don’t have to be extended th mselves to upwardly 
adjust the profit potential on a drug: Rather, the eff ctive patent term can be 
extended simply by reducing regulatory approval time and/or compensating for 
time lost to development. This would increase the profit potential by extending a 
firm’s monopoly reign.  
2. Incentivizing Development for Orphan Drugs by Formulating an 
Optimal Patent Term 
Building on the hypothetical comparison described above, it is useful to 
consider the implications of extending patent terms for drugs that treat rare 
diseases. Turning to Daniel J. Gifford’s framework, consider the implication of 
various patent lengths. Presumably, some inventions would be produced without 
any type of patent coverage, while some inventions would not be produced even 
with a full twenty years of exclusivity. Also, presumably, each year of the patent 
term incrementally stimulates more invention. Finally, under this framework, 
invention is measured in the value to the marketplace.  
In his model, Gifford recognizes that because many inventions are 
afforded patent protection, they are not sold into restrictive markets. While 
acknowledging that these inventions may offer some social benefit, Gifford 
concludes that the restrictions on market access for the invention limits the 




these inventions to 75 percent of their value in an unrestricted market. The social 
loss of the patent is assumed to be the remaining 25 percent that could be earned 
in a competitive market.75 
Gifford’s analysis can be viewed from two perspectives. It can be looked 
at in a glass is half empty context, meaning that 25 percent of potential 
beneficiaries are excluded because of the restrictive patent market. It can also be 
looked at from a glass is half full perspective because 75 percent of social gain 
would not have occurred if not for the invention. The issue then is whether or not 
this invention would have occurred without the restricted market. Furthermore, if 
some inventions may occur without the restricted market and some will not, how 
does a society successfully incentivize both inventions while minimizing potential 
social loss? 
In answering the questions posed above, Gifford concludes that a patent 
system that establishes only one term length for all inventions has the effect of 
increasing marginal social costs for each superfluous year of patent protection.  In 
other words, the one size fits all patent term length creates excessive marginal 
social costs to society. That is because market restrictions apply to products for 
periods beyond what would be necessary to compel the inventor to invent.76 
However, according to Gifford, extended patent protection for products that need 
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it to incentivize their development generates increased marginal benefits on those 
products. Weighing these marginal benefits against the marginal cost associated 
with the patent protection helps determine the optimal patent length for a 
particular product. 
Amir Khoury considers the optimum patent protection t  be the point 
where:  
“[T]he level of patent protection still provides ample incentive for 
continued research and development by the patentee whil  not 
excluding innovative newcomers or hampering consumers’ access 
to innovation.”77  
He notes that this point varies and lists what he considers the determining factors. 
Specifically:  
1. The ratio between the conventional patent term and the projected 
scientific relevance of the product.  
2. The ratio between the successful patents in that field and the 
aborted research in that industry.  
3. The time needed to reap profits to cover the R&D.  
4. The cost of the investment that is required to bring the patented 
product into commercial application.  
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5. The time that is needed to create the invention.  
6. The time that is needed to reach commercialization.  
7. The scope of the market.78  
As Khoury notes, these considerations are especially relevant to the 
pharmaceutical sector. This is because for some drugs, the scientific relevance 
might be great, which supports increasing patent protection under Khoury’s first 
factor. There is also a high rate of aborted research in the pharmaceutical industry, 
again supporting extended patent terms under Khoury’s factors. In fact, each of 
Khoury’s elements applies to the pharmaceutical industry and, in most cases, help 
formulate the argument for increased patent protecti n relative to the protection 
offered for other products.  
Applying Khoury’s factors to the pharmaceutical industry supports the 
notion that some patent terms should be extended in order to promote innovation. 
Khoury did not, however, contemplate how this argument is exacerbated when 
considering rare diseases. The case for extending patent terms for rare diseases is 
supported most directly by Khoury’s final element, the scope of the market. If, as 
Khoury stipulates, patent lives should be extended in the case of many 
pharmaceuticals, then it is reasonable to believe that further extension would be 
                                                        




justified for drugs with a more limited market scope, as is the case with drugs that 
treat rare diseases.  
To further bolster the contention that extended patent terms can help 
incentivize research and development in certain markets, the analysis turns to the 
health production model. The health production model is a useful tool in 
demonstrating how an extended patent term will facilit te drug development for 
certain disenfranchised groups. The model links entry, revenues, R&D, new 
drugs, health, and consumer surplus in a logical sequence.79 The specified links 
include: 
1. Entry causes revenue to fall: TR = TR(E) 
2. Declines in revenues lead to declines in R&D: RD = RD(TR) 
3. Declines in R&D lead to declines in the number of new chemical 
entities: NCE = NCE(RD) 
4. Declines in the number of new chemical entities lead to declines in 
human longevity: LY = LY(NCE) 
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5. Declines in human longevity lead to declines in welfar /consumer 
surplus: W = W(LY).80 
The model shows that increased market competition for a particular drug 
reduces the revenue earned by the inventor of that drug. Applying this case to a 
situation in which expected revenues are likely to be small due to a limited market 
scope exacerbates the subsequent steps. Consider the model in the framework of 
orphan drugs where the affected population is less than 200,000 people. The 
average price of a branded pharmaceutical product in 2007 was $119.51.81 This 
puts static total revenue (TR) for this drug at $23,902,000. Now consider the 
effects of competition on this drug based on the healt  production model. 
1. TR = $23,902,000(35%) = $8,365,700.00. According to a study 
performed by Grabowski and Vernon, the long run effect of 
generic entry branded drug manufacturers is a decline in revenue 
of 65 percent.82 
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2. RD = $8,365,700.00 (35%) = $2,927,995.00. A PriceWaterhouse 
Cooper’s report found that a 65 percent decline in r venues leads 
to a 65 percent decline in research and development spending.83 
3. NCE = 35%($2,927,995.00) = $1,024,798.25. According to a study 
performed by Jensen, a 65 percent decline in research and 
development spending leads to a 65 percent decline in w 
chemical entities.84 
4. LY = 1,021.53. Lichtenberg found that a 65 percent decline in new 
chemical entities reduces longevity by 1.6 million life years per 
year.85 Since we are considering a limited population of only 
200,000, the 1.6 million life years figure was adjusted down based 
on the total U.S. population to come-up with a conservative 
estimate of the life years lost.86 
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5. W = 1,532,290,924.34. Topel and Murphy found that te value of 
the longevity decline calculated by Lichtenberg is $240 billion.87 
This figure was reduced in the same manner as the longevity 
decline by adjusting downward based on the total U.S. population. 
The health production model shows the extent of life years lost, as well as 
the value of those life years, due to competitive pressures in the orphan drug 
industry for rare diseases. It is important to bear in mind that the health 
production model is a one-sided analysis that does n t consider welfare losses due 
to consumers being priced out of the market. It does, however, emphasize the fact 
that most of these drugs are not being developed without adequate incentives. 
Under normal conditions, patents are granted for a limited term that is hopefully 
long enough for producers to recapture a sufficient profit for time and effort in 
development. When potential revenues are reduced du to a small population 
target, the likelihood of receiving sufficient profit is drastically reduced. Thus, 
consider the health production model described above ut without the generic 
entrance.88  
1. TR = $23,902,000.00  
2. RD = $8,365,700.00  
3. NCE = $2,927,995.00 
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4. LY = 0 decline 
5. W = 0 decline 
While this paper is not advocating zero generic entrance into these markets, the 
above comparison expresses the stark difference between a competitive market 
for these drugs and a patent protected market. It can thus be argued that allowing 
continued monopoly profits for a time period beyond the current effective life of 









III.  The Economics of Patents 
The following sections delve more deeply into the economics of patents. 
They review the concept of public goods, which is generally the driving force and 
justification of the patent system. The paper then goes on to discuss some of the 
contributions made by various scholars in this regad. Finally, there is a section 
reviewing theories and justifications of patent recalibration because a 
recalibration of the system is what this paper inevitably advocates. 
A. The Public Goods Feature of Ideas and Knowledge 
Within the framework of the pharmaceutical producer lie two competing 
interests: The drug manufacturer and the drug developer. In 1961, Kenneth Arrow 
analyzed these competing interests. Arrow identified a paradox that stymied the 
free flow of information between resource strapped inventors (in this case the 
drug developers) and idea starved producers (the pharmaceutical manufacturers). 
He noted that the solution to this paradox was to enable property rights to 
inventors of non-rivalorous goods.89 Without these property rights, inventors 
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would be unlikely to disclose full details of their invention, limiting the likelihood 
of public dissemination of their potentially beneficial idea. This is because, as 
Arrow identified, inventors face the issue of public goods.  
Public goods are a specific type of good. They are those goods that are: (1) 
not depleted when shared; (2) do not allow for exclusion once the good is created; 
and (3) have very little incremental cost for additional users. Public goods, 
therefore, are inherently unprofitable.  
Drugs are public goods because they are cheap and easy for a competitor 
to copy. This potential for cheap copying: (1) limits depletion of the drug because 
they can be produced easily; (2) does not allow for exclusion because pharmacists 
and other manufacturers can create the drug at their will; and (3) the incremental 
costs are low without the cost of research, development, and regulatory approval. 
Pharmaceuticals are therefore public goods. 
Based on the traits listed above, private markets may fail to produce public 
goods at their socially optimal level. Under normal arket conditions, 
competitive conditions force companies to lower prices until they reach their 
marginal cost. This generally creates a socially desirable price level, at least in the 
short-run. However, in cases of high fixed costs or high costs sunk into initial 
R&D, this may result in innovating firm insolvency. Knowing this inevitability, 




these circumstances, inventors in an unregulated free market are unlikely to 
devote an optimal amount of capital to innovation.90 
While Arrow advocated property rights be applied to public goods, there 
are certain issues that go along with this methodology. Because patent property 
rights create monopoly markets, the market price will not be Pareto Optimal and 
there will be some amount of deadweight loss in the product market. The patent, 
therefore, creates market inefficiencies. These ineffici ncies are not eliminated 
until the market is allowed to act competitively after the patent expires.  
The use of patents to overcome the public goods problem also creates 
monopoly rents, which may lead to rent seeking behavior. Monopoly rent occurs 
when products are sold at prices above their actual value. In the case of 
pharmaceuticals under patent, because the patent holder has exclusive control of 
the sale of the product, the patent holder can set its own price. While this practice 
may price some consumers out of the market, the excssive profits earned more 
than compensate for the loss of potential end users. Producers therefore have 
incentive to charge prices well above the competitiv  market level.  
Excessive profits from patent derived monopolies compel rent-seeking 
behavior. This is evident in the pharmaceutical industry, which has more lobbyists 
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in Washington D.C. than any other industry and, with 1,507 lobbyists in 2012, 
more lobbyists than Congressmen.91 Rent-seeking behavior has the unfortunate 
effect of limiting competition in the industry by imposing artificial barriers to 
entry such as complex or expensive regulations. Such behavior results in a 
misallocation of resources for companies so that they no longer focus on 
improving their product but rather spend time, money, and energy on lobbying 
efforts. It also limits industry competition and diversity by making it difficult for 
new entrants. As noted by Mancur Olson, the more a country or industry is 
dominated by interest groups, the less economic vitality exists and the more likely 
it is for the country to fall into decline.  
Overcoming the public goods problem with patent based property rights 
may also bottleneck continued development. For example, if Firm A invents a 
new drug and patents that drug, society is theoretically benefitted because people 
can now use the drug and the invention can form the basis for future 
improvements. However, if the drug is patented, future improvements developed 
by Firm B cannot be researched and marketed until after the patent’s expiration. 
Firm A does not have any reason to improve on the product because they are 
already guaranteed monopoly prices. This will retard development by at least the 
life of the patent. Compounding this over the life cycle of each major 
                                                        





development in the pharmaceutical industry can put society behind in its 
development by an unimaginable factor.  
Given the negative implications of solving the public goods problem via 
property rights, there are other possible modes of incentivizing innovation. One 
such solution involves a unifying agency, likely organized by a central 
government, that provides a manner in which those who benefit from the good 
cooperate with each other so as to pool resources. In the instance of 
pharmaceuticals, the pooling of resources could be through a central database of 
research results, thereby reducing the cost of future research and development. 
However, a cost reduction regarding data collection d es not reduce the costs 
associated with regulatory approval. It also does not overcome the risk that the 
drug may never reach the market or be profitable enough to compensate for the 
initial sunk costs.  
Another possible solution to the public goods problem in regards to 
pharmaceuticals is more direct government involvement. For example, 
government may simply step in and provide the public good and/or tax for its 
provision. Government may also subsidize the production of specific drugs, which 
would enable some semblance of a competitive market for end-users. The concern 
for both of these solutions is that they involve ex-ante decisions as to both funding 
size and treated diseases. Furthermore, both of these solutions rely on the 




these programs is not limited to only benefitted inividuals, but rather is spread 
across all groups. Tax based programs are of further concern when recognizing 
that Congress controls the “purse strings.” That is, funding may be cut by a 
Congressional whim, dissatisfaction of constituents, or through spending focused 
austerity measures. 
As outlined by this section, the public goods problem for invention has 
several potential solutions. Kenneth Arrow advocated the use of property rights to 
enable inventors to reap the benefits of their innovati n, although, as the next 
section discusses, Arrow had many concerns regarding the monopoly structure. 
There are alternatives to property rights that can offer a solution to the public 
goods problem. Many of these alternatives require an omniscient presence with 
ex-ante decision capacity (i.e. central government). The major issue with these 
solutions, beyond the forward-looking decision-making, is the funding source. 
Patents, therefore, appear to the best manner in which to overcome this public 




B. Do Patents and the Monopoly Structure Induce or Stifle 
Innovation?  
1. The Perils of the Monopoly Structure - Kenneth Arrow 
Kenneth Arrow believed that “the incentive to invent is less under 
monopolistic than under competitive conditions.”92 This is because new 
inventions cause old technology to become obsolete, causing the monopolist to 
have a “strong disincentive for further innovation.”93 Essentially, if a firm does 
not face competitive market pressure it will stagnate in its innovative endeavors. 
Arrow argues that this concept is particularly relevant where there are drastic 
innovations and post-invention monopoly prices are less than the pre-invention 
monopolist’s costs.94 This structure is exemplified in markets where patent erms 
outlast the requisite length to induce innovation.  
Arrow acknowledges that gaining market efficiency is not a “one-size-fits-
all” proposition. He states that the determination of optimal resource allocation 
for invention depends wholly on the type of inventio  and the market for 
knowledge. In this context, Arrow points out that competition insures a Pareto 
optimum result under certain hypotheses. The basic conditions for this potentially 
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Pareto optimal result is: (1) well-defined utility functions for consumers and 
transformation functions for producers; and (2) the transformation functions do 
not display indivisibilities.95 Focusing on the first condition, two assumptions 
must be met to reach Pareto optimality: (1) No uncertainty in the production 
relations and utility functions; and (2) all relevant commodities must be traded on 
the market. In order for these two assumptions to be met, the commodity must be 
made into private property. 
Arrow’s analysis transitions to a comment on the state of patents when he 
considers the situation of information as a commodity. The cost of transmitting 
information is very low. If this cost were, in fact, zero (which arguably it is in the 
internet age), then the optimal allocation of this information would be unlimited 
distribution without cost. Furthermore, information is completely indivisible. The 
indivisibility of information combined with its optimal allocation results in a 
difficult model for profitability. 
The information’s owner is in an unusual predicament. He cannot simply 
sell the information on the open market because it would be impossible for him to 
preclude others from using it. If he creates a monop ly and uses the information 
himself, he will not be able to exploit the value of the information for any type of 
monetary gain. Legally imposed property rights, such as patents, are a manner in 
which the possessor of information can appropriate v lue from the information. 
                                                        




Risk also plays a factor in considering resource alloc tion of patentable 
inventions. The inability to bear risk can give rise to suboptimal allocations of 
resources. That is because firms cannot measure thei  expected output relative to 
their current inputs regarding a specific endeavor: Firms do not know if their 
investments are likely to prove valuable. According to Arrow, the current 
economic system does have devices for shifting risk, but they are limited and 
imperfect. 
Arrow states that in a free enterprise economy, in order for invention to be 
profitable, there must be a suboptimal allocation of resources. This is because, as 
discussed previously, the cost of transmitting the knowledge gained from 
inventive activity is zero. Accordingly, any price for that knowledge above zero is 
suboptimal. Patents ensure this suboptimal result. 
Patents exist to help inventors appropriate the information they produce. 
Arrow postulates that in order to create any type of fficiency, patent laws would 
need to be incredibly complex and subtle to allow large-scale appropriation. In 
order for an inventor to appropriate his knowledge, if he discovers something, any 
user of that discovery must pay for it. It doesn’t stop there though. If that inventor 
somehow sparks an idea for another inventor, who bases his new invention on the 
original inventor’s knowledge, the new inventor must al o pay for use of the 
original inventor’s information. According to Arrow, under this system, “[o]ne 




to make it work efficiently.96 This is because information, which is already 
difficult to quantify, is not only the output of inventive activity, it is also the input 
of inventive activity. 
The nature of information as both an input and output of inventive activity 
is where the patent issue lies. By creating property rights for patent holders, 
patents preclude other inventors from building on existing information. Inventive 
activity therefore stagnates because patent holders have no incentive to improve 
their existing and profitable technology. New inventors have incentive not to use 
readily available knowledge for fear of being sued. Patents therefore, according to 
Arrow, stifle innovation. 
2. Patent Monopoly Rights and the Lack of Innovation - Boldrin and 
Levine 
Boldrin and Levine argue that there is no empirical evidence to suggest 
that patents increase either innovation or productivity. They state that the patent 
system’s basic problem is that it blocks future innovation with existing monopoly 
grants.97 Boldrin and Levine illustrate this problem with the current relationship 
between Microsoft and Motorola. Microsoft holds a patent for an application used 
on the Android operating system. Motorola must pay a fee to license the use of 
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this idea on its smart phones. In addition to the Microsoft patent, there are many 
other patented ideas that are used on smart phones, all of which must be 
compensated for by Motorola. Dealing with these licnse fees creates a “hold-up” 
problem for Motorola: That is, in creating a new smart phone, Motorola must 
purchase many licenses, which compromises the ultimate value of the new phone. 
Motorola is therefore less likely to develop a new smart phone. 
Boldrin and Levine also argue that, counter to logic of patent proponents, 
there is no empirical evidence to suggest that patents nable the sharing of ideas 
and limit secrecy.98 They use the example of open source software, which is 
software with coding available to all to use and modify. Open software is 
copyrighted and valuable to the original developer; however, the original 
developer does not exclude others from using and enhancing his innovation. 
Boldrin and Levine compare this model to that of Microsoft, with its infamous 
software and operating system disasters. Had Microsoft had a less secretive 
approach to Windows Vista, perhaps the operating system coding issues and bugs 
could have been fixed. 
Applying their theories to the pharmaceutical industry, Boldrin and Levine 
propose reducing drug maker profits to a competitiv 5 percent of the cost of 
drugs.99 They argue that this would reduce overall drug prices by about 50 percent 
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and make competition in the industry in line with oer industries.100 Boldrin and 
Levine recognize that reducing pharmaceutical profitability would potentially 
reduce drug development. However, they conclude that the immediate benefit of 
wider drug availability would exceed the long-term cost of having fewer new 
drugs.101, 102  
To support their theory, Boldrin and Levine looked at recent legislation. 
They turned to the Bayh-Dole Act, which increased the intellectual property rights 
of universities and federally sponsored laboratories. They theorized that if patents 
do increase incentives to innovate, this legislation ought to have bettered the 
research of the universities that it benefitted. Boldrin and Levine, however, 
concluded that the quality of the research did not improve subsequent to the 
legislation and therefore levels innovation did noti crease.103  
Finally, Boldrin and Levine looked to a British Medical Journal study in 
which readers nominated and then voted on pharmaceutical milestones. The 
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winners included Penicillin, x rays, tissue culture, ether (anaesthetic), 
chlorpromazine, public sanitation, germ theory, evid nce based medicine, 
vaccines, the pill, computers, oral rehydration therapy, DNA structure, 
monoclonal antibody technology, smoking health risk.104  Because of 15 winners, 
only two involve patents, Boldrin and Levine surmise that patents were not 
necessary to develop some of the greatest advances in medical technology.105  
Boldrin and Levine are correct in their assertion that the costs of 
intellectual property should be weighed against the benefits of innovation brought 
on by intellectual property rights.106 They have, however, been accused of 
severely misrepresenting the studies they cite to come up with this conclusion. 
Richard Gilbert wrote a review piece of Boldrin and Levine’s meta-study on 
pharmaceutical patents.107 He concluded that while the surveys cited by the two 
scholars do take a critical view of the patent system, the overwhelming conclusion 
of these studies was that patents are a piece of a broader strategy to protect 
inventions.108  
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“[B]y denying any positive role for intellectual property, Boldrin 
and Levine go further than the evidence can support without 
providing new evidence to justify their conclusions. The survey 
results reported . . . do not conclude that patents play no role to 
appropriate value of investment in R&D and thereby stimulate 
innovative efforts, but only that other mechanisms are often cited 
more frequently.”109 
Essentially, Gilbert states that Boldrin and Levine advocate limiting the 
role of patents in pharmaceutical innovation without “considering the 
potential hazards in their preferred world.”110  
3. The Advantages of the Monopoly Structure - Joseph Schumpeter 
At the same time as Kenneth Arrow advocated competition for innovation, 
Joseph Schumpeter studied market concentration for the same purpose. 
Schumpeter argued that perfect competition is “infer or in internal, especially 
technological, efficiency.”111 Perfect competition is inferior because competitive 
firms waste opportunities and capital in trying to compete. This is why, according 
to Schumpeter, perfect competition is temporarily suspended whenever something 
new is introduced.112 
Before delving too deeply into Schumpeterian logic, we must first start by 
defining what it is Schumpeter actually meant by “competition.” Competition can 
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be in the form of both price competition a d competition by innovation. 
Competition by innovation, according to Schumpeter, hits “not at the margins of 
the profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their 
very lives.”113 That is, innovation can destroy existing firms that do not also 
innovate. This is commonly referred to as Schumpeter’s heory of “creative 
destruction.” 
The temporary suspension of competition is justified by the difficulty 
many firms face in securing credit for research and development efforts. When 
firms must borrow to purchase real property, lenders are willing to lend because 
they will have a secured interest in that real prope ty if the lender defaults. 
Conversely, when firms must undertake R&D activities, l nders realize that 
failure is likely, which limits any opportunity for collateralization: If the lender 
can only receive collateral in the product resultant of the R&D, they are unlikely 
to loan money because they realize that there is but a limited chance of the 
finished product’s being worth anything. Innovative firms, therefore, may not 
have sufficient access to credit to fund their innovations. 
In response to these constraints, Schumpeter argued that monopoly 
competition provides protection “against temporary disorganization of the 
market” and secures space “for long-range planning.” 114 Schumpeter further 
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argued that monopoly structures also offer “superior methods,” not available in 
competitive environments that enable monopolists to inn vate because they don’t 
have to deal with “heavy capital requirements or lack of experience.”115 
Schumpeter’s contention is that the monopoly structure is well suited for 
innovation when there is significant risk involved.  
While much of Schumpeter’s arguments focus on the suitability of 
monopolies in innovation, he argued that being a large firm is also sufficient to 
spur innovation. This is because the essential issues that Schumpeter is attempting 
to address are that of experience, financial resources, and capital requirements. 
Large firms have access to credit in that they have more collateralizable 
resources. Large firms may also have a greater cash reserve with which to finance 
R&D. Finally, large firms may simply have more resources at their disposal. 
Therefore, according to Schumpeter, both a monopoly market structure and a 
large firm size can allow for innovation. 
While large firms also offer a conduit for development, Schumpeter 
considers monopolies a strategically important force for social progress. When 
firms are able to earn above normal profits, they have an incentive to enter a 
market and innovate. Therefore, according to Schumpeter, monopoly profits 
                                                        




“might still prove to be the easiest and most effectiv  way of collecting the means 
by which to finance additional investment.”116  
C. Patent Recalibration 
1. Optimal Patent Coverage 
“Traditionally, . . . patent breadth has been deemed th  sole balancing 
element with the patent protection mechanism.” 117 Breadth has been viewed as a 
better instrument than length to facilitate the best social outcome in regards to 
patents.118 Patent breadth refers to the scope of exclusivity afforded by a 
particular patent: The broader the scope, the more valuable the patent. At the 
outset, the tools available to the patent holder that can help determine patent 
breadth include compulsory licensing, experimental use, inventing around patents, 
and humanitarian-motivated social obligations.119 The judicial branch can further 
determine patent breadth through litigation.  
Amir H. Khoury proposed recalibrating patent terms in a “case sensitive, 
differential manner.”120 He questioned whether the breadth of a patent by itself
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would constitute a manner in which to achieve a social equilibrium of optimum 
patent protection. He proposed reaching optimum patent coverage by inducing the 
patentee to innovate, while not excluding either other innovators in the same field 
or consumers. Khoury attempts to find a system recalibration that accounts not 
only for the exclusionary interests of inventors, but the inclusionary social goals 
“for which purpose the patent concept was originally conceived.”121  
According to Khoury, a patent system that uses onlypatent breadth is no 
longer viable. Instead, Khoury advocates a balance between patent breadth and 
patent length for optimized patent coverage. This is because the incentive for 
innovation is contingent on the patent length, the patentee’s rights granted by law 
(i.e. patent breadth), and the commercial viability of the product.122  All three of 
these factors are interdependent: That is, patent length ought to vary based on 
patent breadth and patent length is contingent on the commercial viability of the 
product.  
The relationship between patent length and commercial capacity, 
according to Khoury, ought to be inverse: The longer th  patent length, the less 
commercial capacity associated with a particular product. Thus, calculating the 
commercial capacity of a product enables a society to formulate specific patent 
terms for distinct types of innovation. This implies that the broader the target 
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audience for a product, the shorter the allowable pat nt length. Khoury points out 
that “[t]he model is especially relevant in the pharm ceutical sector, where the 
time between filing the patent application and receiving the patent registration is 
generally commercially worthless.”123 This commercially worthless period limits 
the commercial capacity of the product and, under Khoury’s model, permits a 
longer patent term. 
2. Optimal Patent Length – Nordhaus v. Scherer 
William Nordhaus considered specific inputs in determining optimal 
patent life. Nordhaus stipulated that the formulation of an optimal patent term 
requires reaching equilibrium between the requisite nc ntives for innovation and 
the inefficiencies from patent monopoly rights.124  
To create his model, Nordhaus first considered what it took to actually 
invent. He, of course, observed that to make an invention, R&D costs must be 
incurred. He coined the term “invention possibility frontier” (“IPF”) which relates 
the output for innovation to expenditures on R&D. To simplify his analysis, 
Nordhaus used a simple invention possibility function with continuously 
diminishing marginal returns to inventive activity. Nordhaus’s IPF demonstrates 
that the more R&D time spent, the greater the cost savings, ceteris paribus.  
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Upon development of an innovation, under Nordhaus’s model, a firm has 
two options. It can either secure a patent and exclude other firms with now 
inferior goods or processes from competing, or it can license the patent to those 
other firms and secure royalty rents. In both of these scenarios, the innovative 
firm secures some monopoly power. However, this power does not enable the 
firm to charge a price above the cost associated with hat would have been 
charged in the previous competitive market. As a result, the innovative good’s 
demand is not very elastic around the competitive price. The optimal price and 
quantity for the innovative product will be the same as the price and quantity of 
the product in the pre-invention equilibrium. The price will be lower if the 
invention reduces the long-run cost curve for the monopolist and reduces the 
marginal revenue curve to below the industry output in the previous competitive 
market. 
Nordhaus noted that the longer the patent life afforded a firm, the greater 
the firm’s R&D expenditures. However, there is a balancing act to be performed 








Figure 1 above demonstrates the conventional supply and demand diagram. The 
competitive price and quantity achieved by firms pre- atent is demonstrated by C0 
and X0. The firm that secures a patent in this industry can then continue to charge 
the competitive price of C0, but with a unit cost of only C1. This cost reduction 
grants the firm a monopoly rent of C0BHC1. The price to society of this cost 
reduction from the time the invention is made public until the time the patent 
expires is the triangle BHA, plus the R&D costs of the inventor. The optimal 
patent life is achieved by balancing the temporary societal cost represented by the 
welfare triangle BHA and the R&D costs to the producer against the consumer 
and producer surplus created by the cost reduction of the innovation. 
Through a complex algebraic analysis, Nordhaus determin d that each 
additional year on a patent’s length produces less and less incremental cost 
reduction because later years’ monopoly rents are heavily discounted. At some 
point, the diminishing returns on patent length overpower any interest in 
stimulating cost reduction.  
There are three important elements to be gleaned from Nordhaus’s model. 
First, the greater the elasticity of demand both before and after the innovation, the 
shorter the optimal patent length. This is because as price elasticity increases so 
does social welfare loss, which is captured in triangle BHA of Figure 1 above. 
Second, the easier it is for the innovator to achieve the cost reduction, which 
results in a steeper IPF and a larger equilibrium induced level of cost reduction, 




reductions, society is less likely to defer its netw lfare surplus for even more cost 
reductions. Finally, the optimal patent life is shorter where cost reduction effect of 
the innovation is small. Society is deferring the wlfare gain while the patent is in 
place. If the cost reduction associated with the inv ntion is small, the competitive 
price subsequent to the patent will not be much lower than the price during the 
patent. Society’s welfare gain subsequent to the pat nt will therefore be less. 
Nordhaus concluded that inputs such as research and development cost 
and social value ought to be determinative in the pat nt life for a particular 
product. He noted that patent grants have a stimulus effect on investment. “[A]n 
optimal patent policy sees to it that the monopoly rent lure induces R[&]D 
investment just sufficient to equate the marginal social gain from further cost 
reduction with marginal social cost.”125 His work suggests that optimal patent life 
is extremely sensitive to the elasticity of demand, the discount rate on monopoly 
rents, and the importance of the particular invention. Depending on these inputs, 
Nordhaus opined that an optimal patent life should range from 1 to 34 years in 
length.126 
In response to Nordhaus’s book, F.M. Scherer proposed a significantly 
more flexible variable patent system. He developed this system by cannibalizing 
and adapting the system proposed by Nordhaus. Unlike Nordhaus, Scherer 
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proposed an inflected IPF demonstrating initial increasing returns to research 
efforts that turn into diminishing returns.  
Scherer departs slightly from Nordhaus in his analysis of patent 
investment inducement. While Nordhaus advocated the stimulus effect of patents, 
Scherer added to that effect what he termed the Lebnsraum effect role of 
patents.127 Under this role of the patents, investors must be convinced that the 
patent will deter competitive imitation long enough to sufficiently compensate 
R&D outlays with discounted monopoly rents. Scherer argues that both the 
stimulus effect and the Lebensraum effect must be present to induce innovation. 
Finally, Scherer suggested that patents should initially be given a 
relatively short term of protection, but with the opti n of receiving extensions. 
These extensions would be based on the ability of the inventor to prove that the 
invention deserved greater protection due to the res arch and development spend 
and social welfare benefits.128 He contends that uniform patent terms grant 
excessive payment in some cases. Essentially, Scherer advocated using the same  
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characteristics as Nordhaus to determine patent leng h but with the flexibility of 
allowing for governmental discretion of the overall length during the term of the 









IV.  Incentivizing the Development of Orphan Drugs: 
Patents or Alternatives 
A. Orphan Drugs 
The term “orphan drug” refers to those pharmaceuticals that treat very 
small patient populations known as rare diseases. Congress has defined a “rare 
disease or condition” as affecting fewer than 200,0 people or, if it affects more 
than 200,000 people, a drug a manufacturer would not reasonably expect to be 
able to recover the costs of research and development through sales in the United 
States.129 Currently, there are more than 6,000 of these types of disease that affect 
approximately 25 million people in the U.S. Some of these diseases affect fewer 
than 100 people.130 Prior to Congressional attention in 1983, these diases were 
by-and-large neglected by pharmaceutical manufacturers due to the expected low 
potential for returns. 
Due to their low profit prospects, orphan compounds have historically 
been discovered while researching the treatment of more prevalent diseases. 
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Accordingly, their use and treatment potential were discussed in publications 
without practical pursuit.131 In response to this, Congress enacted the Orphan 
Drug Act (“ODA”) in 1983 to provide incentives to drug manufacturers. This 
program has been generally touted as a success. Approximately 400 drugs and 
biologic products for rare diseases have been marketed under the program since 
1983. This is a significant increase from the 10 such products that came to the 
market in the decade prior to the ODA’s enactment.132 However, these claims 
omit to account for simultaneously held patents by ODA program participants. 
They also don’t explain the effect of Hatch-Waxman that was enacted just one 
year subsequent to the ODA. 
A report issued relatively soon after the ODA’s enactment found that:  
“[T]he incentives offered by the Orphan Drug Act are not 
compelling enough to warrant the diversion of corporate resources 
towards discovery and development of products for the rare 
diseases.”133  
This is because the cost of regulatory approval for pharmaceutical companies 
pursuing treatments for these types of diseases still outweighs the expected 
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revenues.134 Even with the ODA, pharmaceutical companies are still compelled 
by market forces to pursue drugs not targeted towards rare diseases.  
While attempting to discern the effectiveness of the ODA, the National 
Commission on Orphan Diseases performed a study asking 35 pharmaceutical 
companies what compelled them most to engage in rare disease R&D. The 
respondents stated that the seven-year market exclusivity period induced them 
most to engage in R&D.135 Market exclusivity, in this case, is independent from, 
although functionally equivalent to, patent protection. During the market 
exclusivity period, competing firms can develop and/or imitate the drug; however, 
they are forbidden from bringing it to market until the exclusivity period ends. 
Accordingly, the market exclusivity period established under the ODA provides 
less protection than does a patent. 
In his 2006 paper, Robert Rogoyski investigated the apparent triumph of 
the ODA and determined many of the successes attributed to the Act were more 
likely due to patent rights. He determined that 72 percent of drugs that fall under 
the act had patent rights that expire after the ODA market exclusivity period.136 
The market exclusivity period had absolutely no effect on these drugs since their 
patents provided a much broader type of exclusivity. The orphan drugs also did 
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not seem to affect the populations likely to be initially targeted by rational 
pharmaceutical companies. The overall average population of people affected by 
these diseases was 67,200. If the causal link were explained by market exclusivity 
alone, a rational firm would seek to direct its R&D efforts towards diseases 
affecting larger populations first.137  
Instead, Rogoyski suggests that stronger patent rights explain the increase 
in orphan drug development. He points to the 1980 Supreme Court decision 
holding that microorganisms are patentable.138 He also acknowledges the pro-
patent stance of the CAFC, which centralized the appellate court for patent 
cases.139 Finally, he points out that the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted one year 
after the ODA and strengthened patent rights for pharmaceutical companies by 
granting five-year extensions.140 The five-year extension was intended to enable 
companies to regain time lost during the FDA approval process. Given that the 
majority of ODA program participants also have patents on their drugs, the 
market exclusivity period has been effectively rendre  useless. 
Bearing in mind that, as Rogoyski found, 72 percent of drugs that qualify 
for ODA marketing exclusivity also have patents providing much broader levels 
of protection, it can be concluded that the ODA does not, in fact, provide any 
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protection specific to drugs that treat rare diseases. Drug manufacturers have as 
much regulatory incentive to research and develop drugs that have larger end-user 
markets as they do rare diseases, thanks to provisions in the Hatch-Waxman Act. 
The larger potential profit of drugs that have the gr ater end-user markets, 
however, forces them, as rational market players, to pursue research for more 
ubiquitous diseases.  
B. Why Patent Terms Should be Extended to Incentivize Orphan 
Drug Development 
A differential system that provides incentives to firms to develop drugs for 
disenfranchised individuals is likely to produce a more efficient outcome. The 
most effective patent system equates marginal social cost to marginal social 
welfare. Thus, those patented innovations that produce a high ratio of deadweight 
loss to social welfare ought to have reduced patent terms. That is because for 
those products, marginal social cost meets marginal social benefits much sooner 
than patented innovations with a low rate of deadweight loss to innovations.141  
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The issue then becomes measuring the ratio of deadweight loss to welfare. 
Figure 2 below looks at social welfare on a product with a patent and 









The figure shows that the price of this product with a patent in place (PM) is 
higher than its price without the patent (PC). Furthermore, there is a much lower 
quantity of this product available in the market. The producer surplus earned 
under the patent is the rectangle labeled H, whereas the consumer surplus under 
the patent is the triangle labeled B. The deadweight loss in this scenario is 
represented by loss to the consumer and is contained in the triangle labeled A. 
Deadweight loss as applied to patents on drugs that treat rare diseases is 
somewhat misleading. That is because deadweight loss defines a situation in 
which people are being priced out of a specific market. Pharmaceutical patents on 
orphan drugs create deadweight loss for a product that otherwise would not exist. 
This is true in the case of drugs that treat rare dis ases because, as previously 
noted, prior to the enactment of the ODA and the Hatch-Waxman amendments, 
only ten drugs of this category existed: Subsequent to these two pieces of 
legislation, more than 400 orphan drugs existed. Thus, when considering 
deadweight loss in the context of orphan drugs knowi g that these drugs would 
not exist if not for development incentives, it is especially important to weigh 
both sources of consumer surplus: The sale of branded drugs under the patent and 
the sale of drugs off patents.142  
Hughes, Moore, and Snyder performed a study in which they determined 
that welfare losses due to patents causing drug prices to exceed marginal costs 
                                                        




ought to be netted out by consumer surpluses derived from the drug.143 This is 
because they considered surpluses to include the mor intangible aspect of the 
drug’s development itself, although much of this value is not achieved until the 
drug goes off patent and is available through generic brands. Essentially, a longer 
timeframe must be considered to truly measure welfare osses against consumer 
surpluses. 
The static gains in consumer surplus from removing patents are 
substantial, but are dwarfed by the dynamic losses in consumer surpluses that 
come from the removal of the innovation incentive.144  However, patents that 
protect a longer period than necessary to induce dev lopment are fundamentally 
inefficient. This is because for some period of time, these patents provide market 
exclusivity without providing any social benefit. Thus, they grant unnecessary 
monopoly rents and induce rent-seeking behavior. 
Rent-seeking behavior is a negative externality of patents. It helps to deter 
competition by increasing regulation and barriers to entry for potential 
competitors. However, in the case of orphan drugs, monopoly rents are small due 
to the limited end-users. While extended patent terms are intended to increase 
these monopoly rents, they are unlikely to increase profits to a magnitude that 
would induce rent-seeking behavior. These drugs treat populations of fewer than 
200,000 people. Rational firms will not find it cost effective to spend time and 
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resources lobbying to exclude potential competitors f  markets of this size. Even 
with extended patent terms, pharmaceutical companies can still expect to reap 
profits much smaller than that necessary to warrant regulatory manipulation.  
While rent-seeking behavior may not be a major concern in this context, 
regulated access to developments that can be used to compel future developments 
might be. Arrow recognized that inventive activity is both an output and an input 
to new development. Patents can potentially stifle this future development. In the 
case of orphan drugs, which are currently inadequately ddressed, patents may be 
used to increase the initial inventive activity that c n eventually become an input 
in future development. It is unfortunate and unavoidable that by doing so, future 
inventive activity based on existent innovation may be delayed. However, without 
the incentive to create the seed invention, future outputs incorporating that 
invention will be delayed indefinitely. 
C. Alternatives to Patents 
Since the free-rider effect is inherent in innovation, any government that 
seeks to promote improvement must develop a mechanism to overcome this 
problem. There are generally three distinct categori s of systems that can alleviate 
this issue: (1) legal solutions that use coercive power to create and enforce, rights 




sense of moral duty; and (3) business-based mechanisms that enable the firm to 
appropriate returns from their research and development investments.145 
1. Legal Solutions 
Legal solutions offer the advantage of bright line rules and tangible 
enforcement. They include such strategies as monopoly rights, government 
rewards, government subsidies, and trade secrets. As it stands, virtually all nations 
apply some kind of legal solution to facilitate innovative incentives. 
Monopoly rights are the first and most often adhered to legal solution to 
the free-rider problem. This category includes utility patents, design patents, plant 
patents, and copyrights. A monopoly right is granted for a limited time and 
knowledge is transferred into the public domain at its expiration. Monopoly rights 
enable the innovator to control the future of the innovation during the 
patent/copyright’s term, which allows for a better managed innovative 
exploitation. Furthermore, knowledge is more readily sbursed since public 
disclosure is required as a condition for patent pro ection. Such disbursement aids 
eventual competition at the expiration of the monopoly right.146 
The government can provide direct rewards to inventors in order to spur 
innovation. This method can, theoretically, reduce deadweight loss that is 
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associated with the limited time monopoly rights patent system. However, there 
are logistical and administrative difficulties with determining the adequate reward 
for particular inventive endeavors. This problem is especially pronounced when 
there are improvements to existing inventions. Finally, this method possesses 
discretionary issues with determining what qualifies as an innovation worth 
rewarding.147 
In a similar manner to direct government rewards, the government may 
also offer subsidies. These subsidies may be offered prior to the commencement 
of the research. This allows firms to undertake resarch and development projects 
that they would otherwise be unable to finance. It also allocates risk to the 
government as opposed to the innovator. However, it is immensely more difficult 
to estimate innovation’s value ex ante than it is ex post, which would make any 
valuation attempts potentially inaccurate.148 Inaccurate subsidy valuation would 
misdirect innovative projects.  
The final major legal strategy that may promote innovation is a system of 
trade secrets. Trade secrets involve ideas, know-how, or information that may be 
protected by a contract regime with special remedies. They protect an expansive 
set of innovations; however, they allow other firms to legally appropriate 
innovations simply by duplication of work already performed. This not only 
provides disincentive for original innovation, but is also a waste of resources. In 
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addition, the concept of trade secrets is incompatible with allowing innovative 
knowledge to pass into the public domain. Trade secrets have no expiration or 
method for transference so they provide either perpetual monopoly pricing or 
duplicative R&D spending.149  
2. Quasi-Legal Systems 
Quasi-legal schemes generally rely on innovators’ internal motivators and, 
in some cases, the drive and commitment of external org nizations. The methods 
that fall under the Quasi-Legal category include non-profit support, pride/internal 
motivation of the innovator, “copyleft”, and shareware. These methods all rely 
heavily upon the ethical behavior of product users. This, of course, leads to the 
potential for moral hazard. 
Non-profits are the organizational standalone in ths group. They may 
allow for the appropriation of research and development expenditures and are 
especially compatible when the social value exceeds the business value of an 
invention. This method relies on tax-exempt non-profit c rporations to supply 
funding for research and development. The obvious issue is that these firms rely 
entirely on the voluntary remuneration of funds from the general public. They are 
especially susceptible to economic downswings that can cut-off funding. These 
                                                        




rewards do have the benefit of flexibility in fundig timing since they can be 
offered either ex post or ex ante, depending on the organization’s structure.150 
The internal motivation of the inventor comes heavily into play under the 
remaining structures under this category. Pride/intrnal motivation driven by the 
internal desire to invent for self-actualization is a very powerful stimulus for 
many people.151 Copyleft/patleft, which is used by some computer hackers, 
combines contractual licensing and anarchic values to create large programs with 
numerous different authors. The primary hacker retains the program’s copyright 
and distributes the program to others on the condition that if other programmers 
constructively add to the code, they make that addition available to others on the 
same terms as the original license.152 Finally, shareware operates on a similar 
moral basis as copyleft. Programmers release their programs for free in the public 
domain and request users voluntarily pay a license fee.153 
3. Business-Based Mechanisms 
In addition to separately considered mechanisms to stimulate innovation, 
there are some mechanisms that are intrinsic to the business structure itself. 
Businesses that are “first-movers” benefit from the lag that rival firms will 
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experience in trying to duplicate a profitable new t chnology. It takes time to hire 
or retrain personnel, to retool or purchase new equipment, and to change the 
firm’s marketing focus.154 Similarly, some firms are able to appropriate returns 
from innovations by moving along the learning curve quickly, again leaving their 
competitors behind.155 These methods both rely on the adaptability of a particular 
firm, as well as the inadaptability of that firm’s competitors. 
Other business strategies that can facilitate a firm in actualizing 
innovations can be built into the firm’s business plan itself. These include: (1) 
superior sales and service efforts of a firm; (2) the manufacturing capacity of that 
firm; (3) the firm’s increasing returns; and (4) pro ietary architecture.156 
However, all of these methods for appropriation rely on one firm being 
significantly more efficient than its competitors. In a perfectly competitive 
market, this is unlikely to be the case. 
4. Public Funding 
Public funding for pharmaceutical development makes sense when the 
social returns to the basic research exceed the private returns that can be expected. 
In the U.S., federally funded programs have greatly shaped pharmaceutical 
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innovation. Approximately 41.4 percent of drug manuf cturer R&D projects use 
public research findings.157 Given the presence of public funding in the 
pharmaceutical industry, it seems reasonable that public funding is a manner in 
which to positively affect pharmaceutical innovation. 
“Push” programs in the pharmaceutical industry are int nded to subsidize 
the cost associated with drug discovery and therefore push the development of 
new drugs. These programs include the public subsidy of basic research and the 
public subsidy of phase III clinical trials. Basic clinical research is the research 
that takes place at the very beginning of a new drug’s development. The 
exceedingly high failure rate associated with this stage of development is the 
reasoning for targeting it for public funds. “One opti n is public subsidy of large-
scale, not-for-profit consortia that conduct the basic research necessary to identify 
and validate drug targets in humans.”158 This would lead to a database accessible 
to all pharmaceutical companies that would form the basis of much of their future 
research. 
Another manner in which to subsidize drug development is publicly 
funding phase III clinical trials. Phase III trials tend to be the most expensive 
single aspect of drug development. Public funding of these trials is logical 
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because: (1) the government already spends money on phase III trials when 
determining whether or not to approve a drug; (2) the cost of capital faced by the 
government is likely to be less than the cost of capital faced in private industry; 
(3) if phase III trials are publicly funded, regulators are less likely to impose 
additional restrictions on their conduct; and (4) the information on safety and 
efficacy of the new drugs is more likely to be credible and clinically useful.159 In 
other words, the government is already heavily present in phase III trials so the 
infrastructure is conducive to additional funding.  
To determine the viability of public funding on pharmaceutical research 
and development, Margaret Blume-Kohout analyzed the effects of spending by 
the U.S. National Institutes of Health (“NIH”), which provides grants for research 
focused on specific diseases. She found that there is a significant positive, lagged 
effect of NIH funding on specific disease targeted drugs that enter the first phase 
of clinical trials: An increase in NIH funding of ten percent results in a 4.5 percent 
increase in drugs going to initial clinical trials.160 Blume-Kohout also found that 
the ten percent increase in this targeted funding increases the number of drugs 
going to phase III trials by approximately two percent.161 There is a twelve-year 
lag associated with these increases. However, Blume-Kohout has found that 
public funding does effectively increase pharmaceuti al R&D. 
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There are many concerns with government funded innovation schemes. 
The first stems from the possibility of budget cuts that could deter innovation. 
Pharmaceutical companies would need to trust that the government would 
continue to fund research and development. In times of national economic 
contraction, this could be a difficult leap of faith. In addition, there is the 
possibility of waste. If the pharmaceutical companies themselves are not funding 
research and development they may have incentive to pursue research paths with 
little likelihood of success. Even with these potential negative influences, public 
funding is a viable manner in which to induce research nd development.  
D. Why Patents are the Least Worst Option to Incentivize R&D for 
Rare Diseases 
This paper has explored the many pitfalls of the pat nt regime. The nature 
of drug development as a public good and the requirment to protect and 
monetize that knowledge leaves no viable alternatives. For example, if the 
government were to attempt to resolve the public goods problem by developing 
the good, enabling a shared database of information, or providing subsidies for 
private development, it would have to act as an omniscient being to prioritize the 
treatment of ailments and determine adequate R&D expenditures. Furthermore, 
the government is susceptible to funding issues because the money necessary to 
run these types of programs would have to come froms etimes-whimsical 
taxpayers. Enacting a competitive market place for drugs would retard innovation 




regulated as they are in other countries, but that speaks to a structural industry 
consideration and not the relevance of patents in promoting innovation.  
Risks incurred by drug companies in attempting to discover drugs for 
limited populations are even greater than those facd to discover “normal” drugs. 
As Schumpeter argued, monopoly competition provides rea surance against the 
disorganization of the market at these initial stages and allows for long-term 
planning.162 He further contended that the patent pricing structure allows for 
innovation.163  Drug companies considering this type of risky endeavor need the 
reassurances Schumpeter references.   
The patent induced monopolistic pricing certainly has some negative 
externalities, but there are no viable structural alternatives. Pricing drugs targeted 
towards rare diseases at their marginal cost would not cover the associated R&D 
costs. The current patent term of 20 years, which generally establishes an eleven-
year effective patent term, has thus far proved inaequate to sufficiently 
incentivize development of orphan drugs. The assistance gained from the ODA is 
tenuous at best because its enactment closely aligns with strengthening patent 
rights for pharmaceuticals under Hatch-Waxman. While the time period in which 
both pieces of legislation were effective offered more drugs to treat rare diseases,  
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many more of these diseases are still commercially unviable for drug developers. 
Since there appears to be no better way to incentivize nvention than patents, 











The pharmaceutical industry is heavily criticized. The beneficial nature of 
the products it develops seems to induce an expectation of altruistic motives in its 
operation. Despite this, pharmaceutical companies ar  rational, profit-seeking 
firms. They rationally choose not to engage in the production of goods they do not 
foresee being profitable. They use legal means to cover initial costs of production 
and consider these means when determining what products to develop. While 
pharmaceutical companies have abnormally high profit margins when compared 
to other firms of similar size and maturity, they justify these profits based on the 
risk of their business. 
Patents are almost as controversial as the pharmaceutical industry. Despite 
their controversy, scholars have yet to propose a btter incentive for innovation, 
especially in the drug development world. Patents offer the patent holder the 
opportunity to earn monopoly profits for a set period of time in order to reward 
their inventiveness. This is a requirement for rational profit-seeking firms in the 
business of invention, as is the case in the pharmaceutical industry. 
Extended patent terms offer the best way to incentiv  pharmaceutical 




commercially viable. These drugs are targeted towards the often disenfranchised 
group suffering from a rare disease. By extending patent terms, drug companies 
can expect to earn back the money initially sunk into development. The length of 
the extension is beyond the scope of this paper, but wo ld be an interesting area 
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